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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from proceedings in a circuit court other 
than small claims, and hence the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
under Subsection 78-2a-3(2)(d) of the Utah Code. The Notice of 
Appeal dated and filed July 20, 1989 apparently complies with Rule 
3.(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals sufficiently to 
confer jurisdiction upon this Court to review (1) the Order and 
Judgment dated June 28, 1989 which granted plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, including dismissal with prejudice of the Counter-
claim, and denied defendant's Motion for Dismissal; and (2) the 
Ruling dated July 20, 1989 insofar as it denied the defendant's 
Motion for New Trial and Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment. 
However, no other notice of appeal has been filed. 
Therefore it is the position of the respondent that this Court 
does not and cannot have jurisdiction to review any order of the 
trial court entered after July 20, 1989 and before December 15, 
1989. These orders include but are not limited to (1) the Ruling 
on Defendant's Motion for Disposition of Property dated August 10, 
1989 denying the defendant's motion to require the defendant to 
furnish the name and address of the buyer of each item sold at the 
execution sale; and (2) the Ruling dated December 6, 1989 essentially 
denying Defendant's Motion for Enforcement of Exempt Property 
Allowances dated and filed November 17, 1989. 
This action was initiated when the plaintiff and respondent 
filed a Complaint for unpaid rent, restitution of the premises, 
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and damages for unlawful retainer in connection with storage units 
it owned that were occupied by the defendant and appellant. 
The defendant raised the defense of payment, alleging 
first that the rent was less than that claimed by plaintiff, and 
second that he had been paying the rent by reducing the amount he 
claimed plaintiff owed him because plaintiff had denied him access 
to his units when plaintiff claimed a default in the payment of 
rent. The defendant subsequently counterclaimed for his damages 
due to this denial of access. 
The plaintiff then moved to strike the Counterclaim as 
being untimely, and filed an alternative reply which included the 
defense that the denial of access was justified in view of the 
defendant's failure to pay the rent owed. There does not appear 
to have been a ruling on the Motion to Strike. 
After pursuing discovery, plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated May 16, 1989, requesting judgment as prayed 
in the Complaint and dismissal with prejudice of the Counterclaim. 
Defendant likewise filed a Motion for Dismissal of Plaintiff's 
Action on May 30, 1989. 
A Minute Entry dated June 15, 1989 conveyed Judge Backlund's 
decision to grant plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and deny 
defendant's Motion for Dismissal. In accordance therewith, an 
Order and Judgment was prepared and a copy mailed to the defendant 
on June 16, 1989. This Order and Judgment was then signed and 
entered on June 28, 1989, and subsequently appealed. 
The Defendant's Motion for New Trial was filed June 19, 
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1989 and the Defendant's Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment was 
filed July 7, 1989. 
On July 20, 1989, the trial court issued a Ruling listing 
and denying all of the defendant's post-judgment motions. On that 
same date defendant filed the Notice of Appeal appealing from the 
original Summary Judgment as well as from that denial of his 
Motion for New Trial and to Vacate Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The respondent asserts that the pertinent issues among the 
twelve listed by the appellant can be subsumed in the following 
three issues: 
1. Does a mistake on an unsigned reminder notice effect 
a decrease in the rental rate for storage units? 
2. Were the remedies taken by and afforded to the 
plaintiff for defendant's failure to pay the full amount of rent 
in accordance with law? 
3. Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the 
postjudgment actions of the trial court, and if so, were such 
actions in accordance with law? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, which is included in 
the record on appeal (ROA) at 56, plaintiff listed the following 
material undisputed facts. As to the pleadings cited in this list, 
the Answer and its Exhibits are found at ROA 70, the Admissions 
at ROA 63 (and 56), the Affidavit of Audrey Hooper at ROA 56, the 
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Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson at ROA 56, the Affidavit of Lynn 
P. Heward at ROA 56, the Three-Day Notice and Return at ROA 74, the 
Rental Agreement at ROA 74 and 56 and attached hereto, the reminder 
notice at ROA 74 and 56 and attached hereto, and the Complaint and 
its attachments at ROA 74. 
1. Plaintiff is doing business in Utah County, State 
of Utah, and the owner of the premises situated at 420 East 620 
South in the City of American Fork, County of Utah, State of Utah, 
which includes self-storage units, specifically including units 
143 and 144. (Answer J[ 1) 
2. The amount in controversy is less than $10,000 
exclusive of costs. (Answer 5 1) 
3. The defendant William L. Echols resides in Utah 
County, State of Utah. (Answer 5 1) 
4. On or about June 12, 1987, the plaintiff (hereinafter 
sometimes referred to as American) and the defendant (hereinafter 
sometimes referred to as Echols) entered into a Rental Agreement 
pursuant to which American did let and rent to Echols the said 
storage units 143 and 144. (Answer 5 1) 
5. As shown in the said Rental Agreement, a copy of 
which is attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herein, 
the rental agreement was for a month-to-month term based on a 
calendar month, with either party having the right to terminate 
the Agreement by giving written notice of such termination to the 
other party at least 15 days prior to the end of the month. 
(Answer 5 1) 
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6. The said Agreement provided for rent at the rate of 
$55 per month for both units, with American having the right to 
increase the rent by giving notice of the increase at least 15 
days prior to the month when the increase was to be effective. 
(Answer 1[ 1) 
7. Effective February 1, 1988, the rent of the said two 
units was increased to a total of $80 per month. (Answer % 1) 
8. American gave notice of this said increase in rent 
in accordance with the Rental Agreement, and/or any defect in the 
manner or timing of the notice was waived by Echols and the notice 
and the increased rent was accepted and agreed upon. (Answer 1[ 1) 
9. Echols paid $80 on each of three occasions, February 
1, March 8, and April 8, all in 1988. (Answer fl 2) 
10. The said Rental Agreement provided for Echols to 
pay a $7 late fee for all payments not received within 10 days 
of the first of the month. (Answer fl 1) 
11. Thus on April 8, 1988, Echols had paid the rent for 
the period through April of 1988. (Admission If 1 for #2) 
12. In the month of May, 1988, Echols made a payment 
in the sum of $55. He has excused himself for paying this lesser 
amount by arguing that a reminder notice for that month specified 
the old rent. A copy of the said reminder notice is attached 
hereto. (Answer 5[ 3) 
13. Echols made four more monthly payments of $55 each 
to American despite communication to him clearly indicating that 
the notice for May was a mistake and that the rental rate of $80 
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per month had not changed. (Answer 5 4, Affidavit of Audrey 
Hooper) 
14. In view of Echols1 failure to pay $25 of the $80 
demanded for each of these months, American denied Echols access 
to his units beginning in May of 1988 and extending until September 
10, 1988. (Answer J[ 5) 
15. On or about September 10, 1988, American gave written 
notice to Echols that the rent would increase to $94 per month for 
the two units effective October 1, 1988. (Answer fl 4 and Exhibit 
6, and Admission % 1 for #7) 
16. Also on or about September 10, 1988, American agreed 
that it would waive all prior defaults provided that Echols either 
began paying the current properly increased rent of $47 per unit, 
or moved his belongings out. (Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson) 
17. On September 10, 1988, defendant was allowed access 
to his units for the purpose of moving his belongings out in the 
event he chose that alternative. (Answer IT 4) 
18. Echols did not move all of his belongings out of the 
units, and still has not removed them. (Admission f. 1 on #9) 
19. Echols claimed that American owed him in excess of 
$5,000 for formerly denying him access to his belongings. As 
indicated in his letter dated October 10, 1988, a copy of which was 
attached to the Complaint herein and by this reference incorporated 
herein, he planned to add interest at the rate of 1.5% per month 
and deduct the $94 monthly rental from this $5,000 plus interest. 
(Admission J 1 on #10) 
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20. American never agreed that it owed Echols this 
money, nor that Echols could offset such claims against rent. 
(Admission 5 6 on #11) 
21. After making the said five payments of $55 each 
during May through September of 1988, Echols made no further cash 
payments to plaintiff. (Admissions 1[ 1 on #4) 
22. No representative or agent of American ever physica 
entered any of the subject units rented by Echols without his 
permission. (Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson) 
23. However American did follow the extrajudicial 
remedies provided for contractually and by law when there is a 
default, and denied Echols access to the storage units he was 
renting during the period of November 10, 1988 through January 3, 
1989. (Answer J[ 10, Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson) 
24. A Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate dated 
December 23, 1988, executed by Lynn P. Heward on behalf of the 
American, and requiring the payment of $448 was properly served on 
Echols on January 4, 1989. Thus American had determined to avail 
itself of the judicial remedies and eviction procedures provided 
by statute. (Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate and the 
return attesting to its service attached to the Complaint) 
25. The said Notice also included a Notice to Quit 
providing that in any event Echols would be required to quit the 
premises by the end of January, 1989. (Admission f 1 on #16) 
26. This notice of termination was given in a proper 
and timely manner to make the termination effective no later than 
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as of the end of January, 1989. (Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or 
Vacate and the return attesting to its service) 
27. Once again, Echols was given access to his units. 
Confirmation that such access was available was left for him before 
the said Notice was served. (Answer 5 1) 
28. Nevertheless, Echols failed to either pay the said 
$448 rent in cash or vacate the premises. (Admission fl 1 on #4 
and #9) 
29. The monthly rental and the rental value of the 
premises is $94 per month, or approximately $3 per day. (Affidavit 
of Steven J. Nelson) 
30. The said Rental Agreement provided that in the 
event of default on the part of Echols, he would pay all costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which might arise 
or accrue from enforcing the agreement, or in obtaining possession 
of the premises, or otherwise resulting from enforcement of any 
right arising out of such default. (Answer J[ 1, Rental Agreement 
attached hereto) 
31. Should this case be disposed of upon Motion for 
Summary Judgment, reasonable attorney's fees will amount to $1,500 
and costs will amount to $65. (Affidavit of Lynn P. Heward) 
The foregoing list of undisputed material facts presented 
to the trial court at the time of the Motion for Summary Judgment 
would still seem to include all of the facts necessary to determine 
whether the trial court was correct in ruling as it did in the 
appealed orders. However, since the defendant has referred to 
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numerous events subsequent to the granting of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, some of which are not referred to or included in 
the record on appeal, a list of those events will be added hereto. 
1. A Minute Entry dated June 15, 1989 conveyed Judge 
Backlund's decision to grant plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and deny defendant's Motion for Dismissal. ROA at 48. In accordance 
therewith, an Order and Judgment was prepared and a copy mailed to 
the defendant on June 16, 1989. ROA at 43. This Order and Judgment 
was subsequently signed and entered June 28, 1989, and is being 
appealed. ROA at 15. 
2. On that same day, June 28, 1989, the clerk of the court 
executed a Writ of Restitution and an Execution. ROA at 10, 11 
26. These were given to a Utah County Constable, along with a 
Praecipe from the plaintiff's attorney directing that all nonexempt 
property still in the storage units be sold pursuant to the Execution. 
ROA at 42. 
3. The Constable thereupon restored the premises to the 
plaintiff on June 29, 1989 and published a Notice of Property Sale 
dated June 29, 1989 scheduling a sale of the listed property found 
in the storage units for July 11, 1989 at 12:00 noon. ROA at 10, 
11, 26. 
4. Meanwhile, the Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceeding 
to Enforce a Judgment and the Defendant's Motion for New Trial were 
filed June 19, 1989, the Defendant's Motion to Vacate Summary 
Judgment was filed July 7, 1989, and the Defendant's Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order was filed July 10, 1989. ROA at 44, 
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45, 38, 35. 
5. On July 11, 1989 at about 11:30 a.m., Judge Joseph 
I. Dimick was presented ex-parte with an Order to Grant Temporary 
Restraining Order Against the Plaintiff, which he executed at that 
time. ROA at 33. 
6. Plaintiff had allowed the Constable to keep the 
property he was to sell in the same units defendant had previously 
rented. These units had been opened in preparation for the sale. 
Defendant arrived with a copy of Judge Dimick1s Order. The Constable 
honored the Order by not going forward with the sale. However he 
refused to leave the defendant in possession of the property and 
he again put his locks on the two storage units. Defendant had 
previously entered the units and refused to leave. He left after 
he was given to understand he risked being locked in. 
7. The next day Judge Dimick clarified in a Minute 
Entry that the locks on the storage unit were not to be removed 
and that the Restraining Order would expire on July 14, 1989 at 
noon, with any future decision in the matter to be made by Judge 
Backlund. ROA at 32. 
8. After the expiration of the Restraining Order on July 
14, 1989, the Notice of Property Sale was again given, this time 
for July 25, 1989 at noon. ROA at 10, 11. 
9. Defendant then apparently renewed the earlier Defendant's 
Motion to Stay Proceeding to Enforce a Judgment by filing on July 
17, 1989 Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings by Plaintiff to 
Enforce Summary Judgment Against Defendant. ROA at 24. 
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10. On July 20, 1989, the trial court issued a Ruling 
listing and denying all of the defendants post-judgment motions. 
ROA at 18. On that same date defendant filed the Notice of Appeal 
appealing from the original Summary Judgment as well as from that 
denial of his Motion for New Trial and to Vacate Summary Judgment. 
ROA at 15. 
11. On July 21f 1989 defendant filed a case in this 
Court of Appeals, Echols v. Fourth Circuit Courty No. 890455, 
seeking an extraordinary writ and referring to the said July 20, 
1989 Ruling and to the Notice of Property Sale regarding the sale 
set for July 25, 1989 at noon. No writ was issued. 
12. On July 25, 1989 at about 5 or 10 minutes before noon, 
defendant contacted plaintiff's counsel requesting that the sale 
be postponed on the basis that the defendant was in Provo and 
could not travel to the sale by noon. This request was denied. 
13. Defendant's Motion for Disposition nt Property was 
then filed on July 26, 1989, requesting the names of the buyers of 
the property, a list of what was sold, and the amount paid. ROA 
at 13. This was partially granted by means of a Ruling on Defendant's 
Motion for Disposition of Property dated August 10, 1989, with 
plaintiff being required to furnish a written accounting of the 
property sold and the amount received and applied to expenses of 
sale and the judgment amount, but not being required to give the 
name and address of the buyer of such items. ROA at 2. The Accounting 
of Property Sold dated August 17, 1989 was filed in compliance 
with that Ruling. ROA at 79. 
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14. On August 15, 1989, the trial court issued an Order 
in Supplemental Proceedings requiring the defendant to appear 
before the court and answer questions concerning his property, but 
declined to allow that Order to be served by mail. ROA at 1. 
Since he had not been served prior to a hearing on September 26, 
1989, the court ordered him to answer questions at that time 
concerning his property. He answered many questions, but refused 
to divulge the location of a camera and of the video games that 
had been stored in the units before, the denial of access to which 
had allegedly caused him damages of $5,000. ROA at 95, 69. 
15. When the court informed him that he must state 
where those games were, and he still refused, the court found him 
to be in contempt of court, and he was incarcerated until he would 
answer the questions presented. ROA at 93, 96. 
16. Two days later he was willing to talk to plaintiff's 
counsel. At that time he stated he did not own these items any 
more and did not know where they were. However he refused to 
state their last known whereabouts. 
17. On October 4, 1989, counsel for the parties appeared 
at a hearing and stipulated to an arrangement, later embodied in an 
Order dated October 25, 1989, which allowed for the immediate 
release of the defendant from jail and specified a course of 
action by means of which he could remain free. ROA at 102. That 
course of action was essentially followed. 
18. Also on October 4, 1989, counsel for defendant 
mentioned for the first time in this action that some of the 
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property sold may have been exempt. The first written reference 
by the defendant to any exempt property was the Defendant's Motion 
for Enforcement of Exempt Property Allowances dated November 17, 
1989/ again filed pro se. Defendant's counsel had appeared on 
October 4, 1989 and withdrew on November 21, 1989. ROA at 98. 
19. The said Motion for Enforcement of Exempt Property 
Allowances was essentially denied by the Ruling dated December 6, 
1989, referring to the Ruling dated August 10, 1989. ROA at 1. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. A mistake on an unsigned reminder notice does not effect 
a decrease in the rental rate for storage units. 
Plaintiff did nothing that would cause the total monthly 
rental obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff to decrease, 
nor that would estop the plaintiff from denying such a decrease. 
As a matter of law in contract interpretation, there was 
no decrease in rent, and hence no need to follow the procedures 
for increasing the rent in order to maintain it at the previous level. 
2. The remedies taken by and afforded to the plaintiff 
for defendant's failure to pay the full amount of rent were in 
accordance with law. 
Plaintiff had a legal contractual and statutory right 
to deny defendant access to the storage units beginning in May of 
1988 and extending until September 10, 1988. 
Paragraph VIII.b. of the Rental Agreement set forth the 
remedy of denying the defendant access to his personal property, 
and specified that this remedy was available to the plaintiff 
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alone or in conjunction with other remedies in the event of default. 
Chapter 38-8 of the Utah Code impliedly or implicitly 
provides for and condones such denial of access where it is permitted 
under the terms of the rental agreement pertaining to a self-storage 
facility. 
3. This Court does not have jurisdiction to review the 
postjudgment actions of the trial court, which actions were in 
accordance with law. 
Nothing which occurred with respect to the enforcement 
of the Order and Judgment is properly before this Court. However/ 
no error nor need for redress arose during those proceedings, and 
in particular, no exemption rights were violated. 
ARGUMENT 
1. A MISTAKE ON AN UNSIGNED REMINDER NOTICE DOES NOT EFFECT 
A DECREASE IN THE RENTAL RATE FOR STORAGE UNITS. 
This whole case began when Echols claimed that he only 
had to pay $55 a month instead of $80 per month for his two storage 
units. This claim was based on the reminder notice attached hereto. 
As a matter contract interpretation, and thus as a 
matter of law, this reminder notice did not reduce the rent. 
As it was written, the Rental Agreement in paragraph II 
provided for a method to increase the rent. However, there was no 
way set forth to decrease the rent. Thus the only way the rent 
could be reduced would be to have an amendment. 
Paragraph IX.g. of the Rental Agreement specifically 
states, "No amendment or alteration shall be binding unless made 
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in writing and signed by both parties." 
There never was any amendment or alteration in writing 
and signed by both parties. Hence there was no reduction in rent. 
There is no allegation that plaintiff intended to reduce 
the rent, and plaintiff did nothing that would estop the plaintiff 
from denying a decrease in the rent. 
In the first place, it was a mistake on a reminder 
notice. It would not be reasonable for someone to rely on that 
notice, without more, to evidence an intent to reduce the rent 
from the level to which it had recently been raised back down to 
the previous level. 
In the second place, as soon as plaintiff had any indication 
that the mistake had been made and relied upon, every effort was 
made to clarify that it was only a mistake and there had never 
been any intention to reduce the rent. 
A case which includes many of the principles which 
should thus be applied in analyzing this matter is Provo City 
Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979). 
First, this case shows that the trial court was quite 
able to interpret the contract without having to make a factual 
determination: 
In interpreting the contract in question, this 
Court deals with a question of law. Id. at 805 . 
Second, although there could have been a modification of 
the agreement allowing a reduction in the amount of rent, despite 
the lack of provision in the original agreement for such a reduction, 
this could only have happened if there was a meeting of the minds: 
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It is true that parties to a written contract 
may modify, waive, or make new contractual 
terms, even if the contract itself contains a 
provision to the contrary. However, the minds 
of the parties must have met upon an asserted 
contract modification, and there is no allegation, 
proof or finding as to any such modification. 
[Citations omitted.] Id. at 806. 
Likewise in the instant matter, there is no allegation 
or proof of a meeting of the minds. Rather, there is overwhelming 
and undisputed proof of inadvertence and an absence of intention 
and a lack of meeting of the minds on the part of the plaintiff as 
to any reduction in rent. 
Finally, there are no ambiguities in the subject contract 
relating to a reduction in rent. There are simply no provision 
for such a reduction. It follows that no such provision should be 
added: 
A court will not rewrite an unambiguous contract. 
[Citation omitted.] Id. 
Thus, as a matter of law in contract interpretation, 
there was no effective decrease in rent, and hence no need to 
follow the procedures for increasing the rent in order to maintain 
it at the previous level. 
2. THE REMEDIES TAKEN BY AND AFFORDED TO THE PLAINTIFF 
FOR DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PAY THE FULL AMOUNT OF RENT WERE IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. 
Plaintiff had a legal contractual and statutory right 
to deny defendant access to the storage units beginning in May of 
1988 and extending until September 10, 1988. 
Paragraph VIII.b. of the Rental Agreement set forth the 
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remedy of denying the defendant access to his personal property, 
and specified that this remedy was available to the plaintiff 
alone or in conjunction with other remedies in the event of default. 
Chapter 38-8 of the Utah Code impliedly or implicitly 
provides for and condones such denial of access where it is permitted 
under the terms of the rental agreement pertaining to a self-storage 
facility. Specifically, Section 38-8-3 sets forth the procedure 
for selling the personal property stored in self-storage units, 
and provides that no such enforcement of the lien can be taken 
until after notice has been given, which notice must advise of the 
"denial of access to the personal property, if such denial is 
permitted under the terms of the rental agreement" (Subsection 
38-8-3(3)(c)). 
Thus the only prerequisite for the denial of access is 
that such denial be permitted under the terms of the rental agreement. 
Such permission is found in the Agreement as follows: 
VIII. DEFAULT BY OCCUPANT: Time is of the 
essence in the performance of obligations 
created by this Rental Agreement. Failure of 
the Occupant to perform in a timely manner any 
obligation or duty set forth in this Rental 
Agreement shall constitute Default and Owner 
may proceed to do any or all of the following: 
a. Terminate Occupant's right of possession 
of the Storage Unit by any lawful means. 
b. Deny Occupant access to the personal 
property. 
c. Provide written notice of the default and 
the Owners claim to the Occupant [and others] of 
the Owner's claim, a brief and general description 
of the personal property subject to the Owner's 
lien, notification of denial of access to the 
personal property, a demand for payment, and a 
statement that, unless the claim is paid 
within the time stated, the personal property 
will be sold or otherwise disposed of, as 
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provided by law. 
d. Take appropriate action to enforce the 
Owner's lien rights as is provided by law. 
... [Emphasis added.] 
Plaintiff thus under the contract had the right and 
option to follow any or all of the lettered courses of action to 
obtain a remedy for defendant's failure to pay the full amount of 
rent under the Agreement. 
The plaintiff first chose option b. This led to numerous 
letters and documents and arguments and threats from the defendant. 
So plaintiff offered to forget the default if defendant would 
forget his claims and thereafter abide by the contract. However, 
defendant again defaulted and eventually would pay nothing except 
allow an offset on his alleged claim. Again plaintiff initially chose 
option b. as a remedy. 
Finally/ plaintiff decided to follow option a. instead 
of c. and d. Thus defendant was allowed access to his units and 
plaintiff followed the procedures estabished for an unlawful 
detainer action. 
Therefore, in light of the Rental Agreement and the 
applicable statutes, plaintiff did nothing that was actionable or 
prohibited by law. 
3. THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE 
POSTJUDGMENT ACTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH ACTIONS WERE IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. 
As mentioned above under Jurisdiction, the Notice of 
Appeal dated and filed July 20, 1989 apparently is sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction upon this Court to review (1) the Order and 
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Judgment dated June 28, 1989 which granted plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, including dismissal with prejudice of the Counter-
claim, and denied defendant's Motion for Dismissal; and (2) the 
Ruling dated July 20, 1989 insofar as it denied the defendant's 
Motion for New Trial and Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment. 
However, no other notice of appeal has been filed. 
Therefore this Court does not and cannot have jurisdiction to 
review any order of the trial court entered after July 20, 1989 
and before December 15, 1989. These orders include but are not 
limited to all matters pertaining to enforcement of the said Order 
and Judgment, and specifically (1) the Ruling on Defendant's 
Motion for Disposition of Property dated August 10, 1989 denying 
the defendant's motion to require the defendant to furnish the 
name and address of the buyer of each item sold at the execution 
sale (ROA at 2); and (2) the Ruling dated December 6, 1989 essentially 
denying Defendant's Motion for Enforcement of Exempt Property 
Allowances dated and filed November 17, 1989. 
On November 1, 1989, this Court issued an Order Denying 
Motion for Relief, in which the said Motion for Relief was denied, 
a copy of which Order is attached hereto. The Order reviewed a 
number of possible interpretations of the Motion for Relief, and 
gave corresponding reasons for denial. It went on to state that 
"proceedings occurring subsequent to the final order being appealed 
are outside the scope of the issues on appeal, a defect which 
cannot be cured by amendment of the docketing statement filed in 
this appeal." 
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Rather than by amending the docketing statement, review 
of a postjudgment order is obtained by filing a notice of appeal. 
As indicated in the case of Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 
140 (Utah 1982), postjudgment orders are independently subject to 
the test of finality, according to their substance and effect. If 
a party desires to appeal such a final order, that party must 
follow the procedure established and file a notice of appeal 
within the 30 days. 
When such a notice of appeal is not filed, or is not 
filed in a timely manner, summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 
is appropriate. State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521 (Utah App. 1989). 
Since the orders dealing with the enforcement of the 
Order and Judgment were all entered more than 30 days ago, and 
have not been referred to in any notice of appeal, they cannot be 
reviewed. 
However, no error nor need for redress arose during 
those postjudgment proceedings. The Order and Judgment was entered 
after its form had been reviewed by the defendant for the appropriate 
amount of time. The Execution and Writ of Restitution could be 
and were issued immediately. 
Defendant has complained that the Constable's locks were 
not removed immediately in accordance with the Order executed by 
Judge Dimick. Aside from the fact that the Judge corrected this 
oversight as soon as he became aware of it, the defendant could 
not have lawfully removed any of the property, so he was not 
damaged by any failure to remove those locks. 
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Defendant also complains that property not belonging to 
him and/or property that was exempt was sold by the Constable. 
As to property not belonging to him, that would not seem 
to be a defense. The contract provision VIII.d. clearly provides 
in capital letters that in the event of a default "ALL ARTICLES 
STORED -- WILL BE SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF TO PAY CHARGES." 
This contract provision, as well as the law allowing for a lien 
and foreclosure of that lien by sale of the personal property, 
cannot be circumvented merely by having someone other than the 
owner contract for the storage. 
As to the claim that the property was exempt, although 
there may not be any statute that requires the person entitled to 
an exemption to make it known, it appears that requirement is 
implied. For example, in Section 78-23-12 of the Utah Code, it states: 
If an individual fails to select property 
entitled to be claimed as exempt or to object 
to a levy on the property or to assert any 
other right under this chapter, the spouse or 
a dependent of the individual or any other 
authorized person may make the claim or objection 
or assert the rights provided by this chapter. 
This statute would not be necessary, or certainly not 
necessary in such general terms, if Echols had no duty to come 
forward before or at the time of the sale and assert any exemption 
rights he might claim. 
At this time, the defendant has made known his claim. 
However, it was and is too late to claim an exemption. 
In Oliver v. Mitchell, 14 Utah 2d 9, 376 P.2d 390 (1962), 
it was pointed out the claim to an exemption would have to be made 
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before the sale: 
We have no statute providing a formal time 
and manner for claiming an insurance exemption. 
However, there is no reason why the general 
rule should not apply to allow proof of exemption 
any time before sale. Ld. 14 Utah 2d at 13. 
In the instant matter, not only was the sale held before 
any mention of a claim of exemption (or ownership by other parties), 
but the physical possession was transferred to the purchaser who 
was an independent third party, the money paid to the plaintiff, 
and much of the property resold by that purchaser. 
Defendant filed numerous documents pertaining to the 
sale, both before and after it was held. But none of these oppor-
tunities were used to mention any claim of exemption. 
For example, before the sale on July 25, 1989, but after 
being made aware of the scheduling of such a sale, defendant filed 
the 3-page Defendant's Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment dated 
July 7, 1989, referring to "my personal and business belongings" 
and acts of "conversion" (ROA at 38); the 4-page Defendant's Motion 
for Temporary Restraining Order dated July 10, 1989, referring to 
"his [defendant's] business and personal property" and "many 
valuable and irreplaceable personal belongings accumulated over 
his lifetime" (emphasis omitted) (ROA at 35); the 3-page Defendant's 
Reply Motion to Plaintiff's Objection Motion to Stay Proceeding to 
Enforce a Judgment dated July 10, 1989, stating that "the Plaintiff 
now wants to convert the Defendant's business and personal property 
to cash" (ROA at 36); the 3-page Defendant's Reply Motion to 
Plaintiff's Objection to Defendant's Motion for New Trial dated 
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July 10, 1989 (ROA at 37); the 4-page Execution filed by defendant 
on July 12, 1989, referring to an "auction [of] said Defendant's 
personal and business property" (ROA at 31); the 3-page Defendant's 
Reply Motion to Objection to Vacate Summary Judgment dated July 
14, 1989 (ROA at 30); the 4-page Defendant's Reply Motion to 
Plaintiff's Objection to Defendant's Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order dated July 17, 1989 referring to the plaintiff's "stripping 
the Defendant of his property under the guise of Justice, proclamated 
by the Utah County Constable Notice of Property Sale to commence 
July 25, 1989, at 12 noon, See (Attached Auction)" (ROA at 22); and 
the 4-page Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings by Plaintiff to 
Enforce Summary Judgment Against Defendant dated July 17, 1989 
(ROA at 24). As was mentioned, none of these referred to exempt 
property nor even to property of others. 
Likewise, the same language continued to be used after 
the sale. The document pertaining directly to the sale, the 
2-page Defendant's Motion for Disposition of Property dated July 
26, 1989 referred to Defendant's "many irreplaceable and very 
valuable items" but not to items that were exempt or belonged to 
another. ROA at 22. 
Finally, on November 17, 1989, nearly four months after 
the sale, the first documents were filed by defendant which referred 
to exempt property. These documents were filed too late to be 
part of the record on appeal. Likewise, they were filed too late 
for the Court to be able to equitably make allowance for any such 
exemption. All the items of personal property had been sold in a 
27 
final sale on July 25, 1989, to an unrelated third party, and 
nearly all of the items have been resold to other parties since then. 
Not only does the delay in claiming an exemption bar 
defendant from now claiming error, but it indicates that in all 
likelihood, nothing was sold that was exempt. Another such indication 
is that he and/or his family reside in a home which is probably 
furnished with their belongings. Defendant would never divulge 
his home address. He has indicated he has a wife and children 
living in a home in Utah County, but he will not be more specific 
as to the address. It is only logical that the property that 
would be exempt from execution would thus be in a residence at a 
location unknown to plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
The appealed orders of the trial court should be affirmed 
in all respects, since in view of the undisputed facts, they 
comport with law, justice, and equity. 
DATED this / 7 day of ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ s _ , 1990. 
^^%«^^t ft 
LYNN P. HEWARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that the required number of copies (two 
per agreement with the defendant) of the foregoing Brief were 
mailed to William L. Echols, 733 North 800 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
^ •"* 
on this / I ~~ day of /^—<~-?*~^ , 1990, with postage attached p ^ -^ ^ 
thereon. 
420 EAST 620 SOUTH, AMERICAN FORK, UTAH 
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RENTAL AGREEMENT 
£-X k kl/l OCCUPANT'S NAME 
(LAST) 
HOME ADDRESS *]33 Ajf ft**?0 ^ -
BUSINESS NAME & ADDRESS 
UlMA- L_ 
_CITY 
(FIRST) (INITIAL) 
ZIP 
HOME PHONE 2ZZ^2ilTW0RK PHONE 
TODAVS DATE ^42l i l_OCCUPANCY TO START . 
UNIT NO /W-7 J- ^ H FOR $_ 
IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, CONTACT M*jL±_ 
TYPE OF GOODS S fORED muM^nlci 
.DRIVER'S LICENSE 61\ 0*4*7 J'3 
££. o>0 
JriuUL^ 
/Month 
r-
RENTS AND DEPOSITS 
Rent(proration of current month) 
Rent(1st month) 
fa \ Security Deposit 
Miscellaneous 
Total received 
Amount 
% -, . 
$ 
cO 
Owner, AMERICAN, Is the owner of that certain property consisting of storage units at the location identified 
above In connection therewith, the Owner by this agreement does hereby let and rent to the Occupant the above 
numbered storage unit(s) at the said location (hereinafter called "site") for the rental and the penod of time above 
indicated and upon the terms, conditions and covenants specified on the reversu side hereof, and as to which the 
Occupant does hereby agree. 
I HAVE READ AND DO UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT, 
INCLUDING THE TERMS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, 
AND DO HEREBY ACCEPT THE SAME 
I ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE INSURANCE 
ON THE CONTENTS OF THE STORAGE UNIT AS 
SPECIFIED ON THE REVERSE HEREOF 
AMERICAN SELF STORAGE 
OCCUPANT MANAGER Q 
L RENTAL OF UNIT: In consideration of all covananta and conditlona contalnad In thla Rental Agraamant Including and baaed upon tha Information of tha front, 
Ownar ha/aby rtrta to Occupant etorage unit aa dascribad apacJflcaliy on tha hcnt of thla agrasmsnt it IK mutually understood by the parties that Owner la not in 
thf warehouse buslneat, nor in tha buaineae of storing; goods for hira and under no clicumslancaa tt hall 0.vn«r be deamed to be b«Jle« or olh*r type cf cueiodl«n 
Owner's employ tee hava baan forbiddan from providing any aarvlcaa on bahaif cf Owner Should employee* of Qv^ rver prcvlda aaivicaa i t OtcHipant'e requaet, they 
ahaJI be deemed to b« aganta of Occupant 
M. RENT: Occupant ahall pay in legal currancy to Ownar at tha oft lea of Owner's agant iocatad at tha tlta In advance, on tha flrat day of the month tha Rant for that 
month Occupant agreaa to pay a $7 00 lata faa for all paymante not received within 10 daya from tf-e flrat day of tha autjact month for which payment la dif 
Ownar may accept correctly drawn checka for payn.ent of Rent if a check la returned uncollected, pe/rnenta represented by It ehail bo considered delinquent on 
the date originally due and ehail be subject to the (20 00 Returned Check Chuge plua lata chargee Owutr rnti/ Increase tha Rant by notifying Occupant In writing 
at least 15 daya prior to the first day of the month for which the Increased Rant la due Occupant shall payihe increased Rant from tha date It becomee wffectlve 
An Occupant unwlili »g lo pay the increeeed Rant may terminate the Rental Agreement as pro/ided In item It) below. 
III. PERIOD OP OCCUPANCY. The Parlod of Occupancy created by thia Rental Agreement ehail begin aa of the date of thla Rental Agraamant and shall continue 
from month to month Occupa^i or Owner may terminate the Occupancy created by this Rental Agreement by daiivorlng written notice to the other parly of its in-
tention to do to at ieest 15 days prior to the iaat day of tha Rants.1 Month Property left in ih» Storage Unit after the termination date, and/or any property left In the 
Storage Unit at any time after rental payments are 30 days in a/rears, will ba doemad fcbandoned by Occupant After aaid data Owner mcy remove any lock frcm the 
Storage Unit and dlapoee of the contenta theteof without r otic* or liability to the Occupant Owr.er shall give notice cf intent to dispose oi &ald propaity to any par-
ty with an Intereat In said property of whom the Owner has knowledge either through the Leinholder disclosure provision of this Rental Ayeamet t or through 
notice occasioned by a filed financing statement, M provided by law Owner may alao terminate this Re. tal Agreement by any other m«ana p<ovidad by law 
IV RESPONSIBILITY FOR OCCUPANTS POSSESSIONS. Owner ahall h»v9 no liability for damage o« loss c&uaad by heat, cold, theft vandalism fire, water, wlnda, 
dust rain, exploalon, rodents insects or any othar cause whatsoever Owner carrlos no Insurance covering any lost of Occupant a posaessfoi a Occupant agrees 
to obtain s.nd maintain a policy of flra and extended coverage Insurance with theft, vandalism, and malicious mischief endorsements to thte a »ient of 100% of the 
roplacment value of the property In the Storage Unit To the extent Occupant doea not maintain such Insurance Occupant agree* to 'self Insure' the propi.fi/ to 
the extent of its Full Value Owner shall not ba liable to Occjpant or Occupants invitees for personal injuries or damage to personal property caused by any act or 
negligence of any person on the Site Occupant hereby agreea to irdamnify and hold harmless the Owner from any and all claims for damages to property or per 
sonal injury and costs Including attorney's feea arising from the Occupant's use of the premises Owner shall not be deerred to either «^prassiy or impliedly pro-
vide any security protection to Occupant s property maintained at the Site Any security devices which Owner may maintain at the bits are for Owner's conve-
nience only Ownar may also terminate this Rental Agreement by any other meant provided by law 
V PERFORMANCE AND GOOD CARE DEPOSIT Occupant has paid the Performance and Good Caie Deposit referenced on the front of this agreement The Perfor-
mance and Good C*(6 Deposit without Interest, shall bo returned to Occupant within 30 days after the Termination ol Occupancy if but oriy If, payment of all 
sums owing by Occupant are received by Owner, If the Storage Unit Is surrendered by Occupant in a broom clean ' condition and d*»r"agij free Performance and 
Good Care Deposits may be commingled with funds in Owner s general account Owner may at itb opt.on deduct from the Performance and Good Care Def oait 
any unpaid charges, damages or Tent due without notice to Occupant Should tha totel deduction excoed the amount ol the Performance Deposit Occupant shall 
pay Owner thu amount of such excess 
VI USE OF THE STORAGE UNIT. Occupant shall comply with ail government iawa, rules and regulations regarding use ol the Storage Unit Occupant shall not use 
such Unit to store any flammable, combustible explosive, corrosive perlshablo noxious or dangerous materials Occupant shall net place any signs or markers 
aboul tha Unit Occupant shall not usa tha Storage Unit for residential purposes OCCUPANT WARRANTS THAT A( L ITEMS PLACEO BY OCCUPANT IN TH£ 
STORAGE UNIT SHALL BE OCCUPANT S OWN PROPERTY, r-REE OF ALL INTERESTS OR LIENS OF ANY LIENHOLDERS EXCEPT!HGSfc.' WHICH AS REQU.RED 
BY LAW OCCUPANT HAS DISCLOSED IN THIS RENTAL AGREEMENT OR IN SJBSEGUEHT WRITTEN NOTICE TO THE OWNER All peraunj property located In 
the Storage Unit shall be subject to enforcement of the Owner s lien for rent, labor or other charges in rotation to the personal property a d for expenses necessary 
for its preservation or reasonably incurred In its sale or other disposition aa provided by law Occupant ahall not place any persona) proputy or material outside 
his Storage Unit Any personal property or material found outside any Storage Unit shall conclusively be presumed to be aoandJnea and may be disposed ol by 
Owner without any liability of Owner to Occupant Occupant must keep Occupant s Storage Unit locked and provide nls CA. I lock and Kay Occupunt may place on 
ly one lock on Occupant s Storage Unit and hereby authorized Owner to rer love any additional locks by cutting or suwlng the same frcm the latching device for 
such Storage Unit 
VII DELIVERY OF NOTICE. Occupant's addresa ahall be conclusively presumed to be the address provided by Occupant in this Rental AOreement unless Occu-
pant provides Owner with a subsequent written notice of a change of address All notices required or permitted b/ thia Rental Agreuinont snail be presumed 
delivered when either delivered in person or deposited with United States Postal service propeily addressed with postals prepaid except aa cth6i »ibO provided by 
law 
VIII DEFAULT BY OCCUPANT. Time is of tha essence in the performance of obligations created by this Rental Agreement Failure of the Occupant to perform in a 
timely manner any obligation or duty set forth in this Rental Agreement shall constitute Default and Owner may proceed to do any or all of the following 
a Terminate Occupant's right of possession of the Storage Unit by any lawful meant 
b Deny Occupant accesa to the personal property 
c Provida written notice of the default and the Owner's claim to the Occupan^ to any teinhoider with an Interest in ihe property of *hom the Owner has knowledge, 
either through disclosure provisions in this Rental Agreement or through notlco occasioned by a validly filed financing statement ol tho Owner s claim, a brief and 
general description of the personal property subject to the Owner's lien notification of denial of access to the personal property a demand for payment, and a 
statement that unless the claim is paid within the time stated, the personal property will be jold or otherwise disponed cf a.4 providaJ t / law 
d Take appropriate action to enforce the Owner's lien riQhts as is provided by law LIEN UTAH LAW GRANTS TO THE OWNER OF A STORAGE FACILITY A LIEN 
ON GOODS STORED IT STATES THAT "ALL ARTICLES STORED UNDER THE TERMS OF A RENTAL AGRELMENT, AND CHARGES MOT HAVING BEEN PAID 
FOR A CONTINUOUS 30 DAYS PERIOD WILL BE SOLD OH OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF TO PAY CHARGES " (Utah Commercial Coue 38 8-1 ) 
in addition to the overage amount represented by the Owner's lien, Occupant shall be obligated to Owner for ail costs charges, fees or o^pen^es associated with 
enforcement by Owner of Its rights including without limitation reasonaole attorney s fees, court costs, service of process fees, appiaijal fees and any and <*tl 
othar costs, as provided by law 
IX. MISCELLANEOUS a. if any portion of thia Rental Agreement for any reason is declared Invalid, such decision ahall not affect the vaiid'iy of any remaining por 
tlon Of the Rental Agieement 
b All the provitione hereof shall apply to, bind and obligate the heirs, personal representatives, successors, assigns, agents and repietnntatlves of the parties 
hereto 
c The provisions of this Rental Agreement and the right of the parties heratc shall be construed In accordance with applicable law of tr a Stats of Utah Including, 
but not limited to provisions relating to Self Service Storage Regulation. Utah Code Annotated 36-8 l through 38 8 5 
d No waiver by Owner its agents representatives or empiOyeat of any breach or default In the performance of any covenant condition or term contained horein 
shall constitute e waiver of any subsequent breach or default in the porformunca of the sun e or any other covenant, condition or to m ho eot 
e No subletting of the Occupant s Storage Unit or any portion thereof or assignment of this Rental Agreement by Occupant is permittr J 
I The heading of the various provisions of thia Rental Agreement have bo«n Included only for the convenience of the parties and are not to be used in ascertamg 
the intentions of the parties 
g This Rental Agreement Is the complete and only agreement between the parties and supersedes any prior written or oral agreement No amendment or altera-
tion shall be binding unless made In writing and signed by both partlaa 
DISCLOSURE OF LIENHOLDERS 
Item Llenhoider _ 
Item Llenr older 
Occupant represents that he has reed and understands the foregoing Rental Agreement, Including the terms on the reverse side he.eof and agrees to be bound by 
all provialons therein Occupant alao represents that he has personal knowledge oi all information supplied by him and contained herein and thu such Informa-
tion is true and complete Occupant personalty guarantees prompt payment of rents Occupant has received a fully completed and signed copy of thia Rental 
Agreement 
Occupant'a Signature 
unit NO. /V'S^ /Hi Payment for the month of: 
Current Rent S ££- ^hS-^SQ 
^Du. on P a t . Sent Advance Rent $ _ _ _ 
after th« 10th of th« 
Month ^Late Charge $ 
Other $. 
Total Payment 
Enclosed $. 
DETACH AT PERFORATION. THIS IS YOUR RECEIPT. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
F I L E D 
j N Q V ^ 1989 
^ V ,cf * » Court 
wuuriGi Appeste 
American Fork Investors, a 
California limited partnership, 
dba American Self Storage, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
William L. Echols, 
Defendant and Appellant* 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR RELIEF 
Case No. 890461-CA 
Appellant is proceeding pro se and has filed a "motion for 
relief,M the exact purpose of which is less than clear. 
Insofar as the motion is one for a stay, it must be denied 
because appellant has failed to comply with the requirements of 
Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Insofar as he otherwise seeks to suspend enforcement of the 
judgment, the motion must be denied because he has not filed a 
supersedeas bond as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 62(d). Insofar 
as the motion seeks summary reversal of the judgment appealed 
from, summary reversal has previously been denied. The present 
demand for reversal is inadequately supported and'must also be 
denied. 
Furthermore, proceedings occurring subsequent to the final 
order being appealed are outside the scope of the issues on 
appeal, a defect which cannot be cured by amendment of the 
docketing statement filed in this appeal. 
Appellant's motions are accordingly denied. 
/it-Dated this _] day of November, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
